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NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion of policies in view of then existing facts. Now the Supreme
Court of the United States announces that the law must be tested by
the application of policies upon present facts. If it does not meet the
test, it must be replaced. The decision in the principal case is an en-
lightened one.
D. W. MARKHAM.
Conflict of Laws--Forum's Use of the Construction
Given a Foreign Statute by a Third State.
Plaintiff, a gratuitous guest in defendant's automobile, was injured
in an accident occurring in South Carolina. Suit was brought in
Georgia, and the South Carolina "guest statute" was pleaded as the
basis of recovery. The complaint, which relied on the host'sunlawful
speed, failure to equip the car with a suitable steering apparatus, opera-
tion of the car with knowledge of its defective condition, and inatten-
tion while driving, was held demurrable as failing to show that the
accident was "intentional on part of the owner or operator or caused by
his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others" so as
to permit recovery under the statute.
2
In attempting to apply the rule of lex loci,3 the Georgia court, as the
forum, found it necessary to find the meaning of the terms "heedless-
ness or reckless disregard" as used in the South Carolina statute in
order to construe and apply that statute to the facts alleged in the
complaint.
4
The statutes of a foreign jurisdiction are generally given the same
construction by the courts of the forum as that given by the courts of
last resort in the foreign state.5 But the statute in question here had
never been construed by the South Carolina court. In view of this fact,
the forum considered the Connecticut court's construction of the Con-
necticut "guest statute" on the presumption that South Carolina in
adopting a statute verbally the same adopted it in view of previous
Connecticut constructions. This presumption is supported by reason
I S. C. CODE (1932) §5908. This statute, passed in 1930, changed the common
law rule of ordinary negligence to require intent or heedlessness or reckless dis-
regard on the part of the owner or driver before his gratuitous guest could claim
a right of action against him. See notes 8 and 20, infra.
'Lee v. Lott, 177 S. E. 92 (Ga. App. 1934).
'White v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 14 Ga. App. 139, 80 S. E. 667 (1914) ; Wise
v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82 (1933); GOODRIc H, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) §92; RFSTATMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§411X, 413.
'Lee v. Lott, 177 S. E. 92, 94 (Ga. App. 1934).
'Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, 188 Ark. 177, 65 S. W. (2d) 1 (1933);
Georgia, Fla. & Ala. R. Co. v. Sasser, 4 Ga. App. 276, 61 S. E. 505 (1908) ; White
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 14 Ga. App. 139, 80 S. E. 667 (1914).
'Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 308.
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and authority 7 and affords the forum a practical means of approximat-
ing the law of the foreign state. However, the forum did not content
itself with an examination of Connecticut decisions but also considered
Georgia and South Carolina rulings on degrees of negligence and willful
misconduct.
8
In view of the cases examined, the forum seems amply justified in
sustaining the demurrer.9 But suppose the Georgia definitions had
been so different from those of Connecticut that if followed a different
result would have obtained.1 0 Would the forum, having presumed the
lex loci to be the same as the law of Connecticut, feel inescapably bound
by this "foreign law" to the exclusion of its own? The question in-
volves more than the old difficulties of defining degrees of culpable
conduct, for an adequate answer necessitates a choice between two
conflicting views of the bases of conflict of laws.
The Restatement adopts the "vested rights" or "obligatio" theory
of foreign created rights.'" According to this view, the only source
of the tort obligation is the lex loci and therefore that alone must de-
termine the existence and the extent of the obligation.' 2 This limits,
"Fuller v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 128 S. C. 14, 121 S. E. 478 (1924);
Shiveley's Adm'r. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 125 Va. 384, 99 S. E. 650 (1919).'Lee v. Lott, 177 S. E. 92, 94 (Ga. App. 1934). Under the Conn. decisions
"heedlessness or reckless disregard" was construed as "heedless and reckless dis-
regard." Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 147 At. 136, 137 (1929). And
"wanton misconduct" is equivalent to "reckless disregard." Menzie v. Kalmono-
witz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 Atl. 698, 699 (1928). The examination of the Georgia
and South Carolina cases -was to further define "wanton misconduct" and "reck-
lessness."
Georgia has no "guest statute" but follows the "Mass. rule" (Massaletti v.
Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 [1917]) of "gross negligence." Epps v.
Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 108 S. E. 297 (1923).
' Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240 (1928) ; Bordonaro v. Senk, 109
Conn. 428, 147 Atl. 136, 137 (1929) ; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Moore, 5 Ga. App.
562, 63 S. E. 642, 644 (1909) ; Buffington v. Atlanta, Birmingham & Coast R. Co.
47 Ga. App. 85, 169 S. E. 756, 757 (1933); Hull v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. 76
S. C. 278, 57 S. E. 28 (1907).
"o The forum will not enforce a foreign statute if penal or if violative of the
public policy of the forum. Southern Rwy. v. Decker, 5 Ga. App. 21, 62 S. E.
678 (1908). No constitutional provision expressly prohibits the forum from
wholly disregarding the foreign facts and foreign law, though the due process
clause has been applied as a limitation on legislative power in such cases as
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897). See,
in this regard, Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, Foreign Created Rights (1930) 8 Trx.
L. REv. 173; note (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 213. The Restatement enters a caveat
here: RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §45. But see Cardozo, J., in
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
u REsTATEmFNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §43; Slater v. Mexican National
Rwy., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed. 900 (1904); Western Union v.
Brown, 234 U. S. 542, 124 Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. ed. 1457 (1914); Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) ; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1916) 106; GOODRI H, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 10; Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws, Torts, Texas Decisions (1930) 9 Tax. L. Rav. 26.
'GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) §94. See Western Union v. Brown;
Slater v. Mexican National Rwy.; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., all supra note 11.
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by implication at least, the power of the forum to do more than recog-
nize and enforce a "foreign created right," the leax fori being material
only as setting a policy beyond which the obligation will not be enforced
there.1 3
A contrary view, as expressed by Cook, Lorenzen and others,
14
holds that there is nothing fundamental in the application of foreign
law and that, in fact, the plaintiff's right is always determined by the
leax fori which "imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous
as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurred."1 5
Under this view the effect of the foreign law as a factor in the case
"depends on ideas of expediency, policy, and fairness at the forum and
not upon a hypothesis of power abroad to create rights."'
6
Since, in the last analysis, the forum must determine the rights of
the parties before it, whatever legal rules and principles it chooses as a
model for its decree, should not the approach to conflict of laws prob-
lems be from this pragmatic basis rather than from an a priori assump-
tion of "foreign created rights"? Only by such an approach is ref-
erence possible to all the circumstances that might have a bearing on
reaching the best result.
17
The "foreign created rights" view as a valid and controlling prin-
ciple is challenged by the Georgia court's holding that if the liability of
the defendant had been of common law rather than of statutory origin,
the lex fori rather than the lea loci would have controlled.' 8  Also if
the forum should consider the degree of negligence required to impose
liability under the leax loci inconsistent with the policy of the forum, it
might enforce a "right" different in scope from that of a "right" under
the decisions of the foreign court, and this could not then be accurately
called a "foreign right."'19  Even if a forum nominally adopts the lex
Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 478, 32 Sup. Ct. 132; 56 L. ed. 274 (1911).
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, (1924) 33 YALE
L. 3. 457; Cook, Recognition of Mass. Rights by N. Y. Courts (1918) 28 YALE
L. J. 67; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 736; Stumberg, loc. cit. supra note 11; Stumberg, loc. cit. supra
note 10.
' Learned Hand, J., in Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S. D. N. Y.
1923).
Stumberg, supra note 10, at 174; Stumberg, supra note 11, at 21, n. 1.
17 Stumberg, supra note 10, at 194.
'Hall v. Slaton, 168 Ga. 710, 148 S. E. 741 (1929) reversing 38 Ga. App. 619,
144 S. E. 827 (1928) (plaintiff suing for injury occurring in Alabama where
ordinary negligence permits guest's recovery, is held to Georgia's'requirement of
gross negligence.) This is not the prevailing view, however: Askowith v. Massell,
260 Mass. 165, 156 N. E. 875 (1927) ; Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E.
82 (1933) but see note 20 infra; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §413 X.
"Cook, Tort Liability and Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 202.
Similarly, where damages are being assessed and estimated the rule of the forum
may be applied. Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Sasser 4 Ga. App. 276, 61 S. E. 505
(1908) ; Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N. W. 918,
922 (1904) ; Note (1932) 24 A. L. R. 1268.
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loci as controlling, it may accept only the terminology of the foreign
law and look to its own decisions for substantive definitions.20
Among the American decisions, 2 1 the results reached and the lan-
guage employed seem to support the .'vested rights" theory, but on
closer examination, particularly of contract cases, it is evident that
rulings have been shaped with a view to the result desired and without
any real basic theory common to all the cases. 22 It is submitted that
the hypothesis of the "vested rights" theory of conflict of laws does not
accurately describe the legal phenomena with which it treats and that it
involves limitations on the power of the forum which make it impractical
and undesirable as a binding rule for the guidance of the courts.
23
R. MAYNE ALBRIGHT.
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Price Control of Milk.
The New York Milk Control Act prohibited the sale within the
state of milk purchased -from producers in other states at a price less
than the minimum payable to producers within the state.' Plaintiff
dealer in New York City purchased milk from producers in Vermont at
prices below the minimum fixed -by the Act, and sold it in New York
both in the original containers and in bottles. Plaintiff was denied a
dealer's license because he refused to comply with the provisions of the
Act and the regulations thereunder. After being threatened with prose-
cution for trading without a license, plaintiff sued to enjoin enforcement
of the Act. A District Court of three judges granted an injunction
against the enforcement of the Act as to sales in the original cans but
denied relief as to sales in bottles after removal from the cans.2 On
' Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82 (1933) (N. C. accepted the
Virginia common law rule of "gross negligence" but applied its own definitions to
the terms). See a criticism in (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 247. For a criticism of
the N. C. rule of ordinary negligence, see Brogden, J., dissenting in Norfleet v.
Hall, 204 N .C. 573, 169 S. E. 143 (1933). For a proposed statute for N. C., see
(1930) 9 N. C. L. REv. 47.
1 England does not recognize the "vested rights" theory in tort cases but re-
quires the foreign wrong to be such as would have been actionable if committed
in England. Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1 (Ex. 1870).
' Stumberg, sitpra note 10, at 184, 186.
' Lorenzen, mspra note 14, at 751.
1 New York Agriculture and Markets Law, Laws 1934, c. 126, 258m (4),
article 21-A; formerly Laws 1933, c. 158, 312 (g), article 25 ("It is the intent of
the legislature that the instant, whenever that may be, that the handling within the
state by a milk dealer of milk produced outside of the state becomes a subject of
regulation 'by the state, in the exercise of its -police powers, the restrictions set
forth in this article respecting such milk so produced shall apply and the powers
'conferred by this article shall attach. After any such milk so produced shall
have come to rest within the state, any sale, within the state by a licensed dealer
or a milk dealer required by this article to be licensed, of any such milk purchased
from the producer at a price lower than that required to be paid for milk produced
within the state purchased under similar conditions, shall be unlawful.")
'Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
